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The Cobblestones of Good Intentions:
Substantive Due Process and
Infant Genital Normalizing Surgery
Benjamin Sweeney*
INTRODUCTION
“[I]n its function, the power to punish is not essentially different
from that of curing or educating.” – Michel Foucault1
Practitioners and scholars of law must always be cognizant of the
immense power of law as a tool of benevolence and magnanimity. The
pursuit of justice does not end at the edge of law’s function as a punitive
mechanism; furtherance of justice must also address the wounds created by
misinformed attempts at benevolence. The most vulnerable members of
society, those who most need the protection of the law, are often the most
affected by misplaced goodwill. Children, in particular, comprise a group
that deserves the laws attention, but has little voice within the law. Children
are especially vulnerable to misguided attempts of assistance, particularly
where the law does not understand or accept the realities of their lives. A
particularly stark demonstration of this dynamic is in the choices made on
the behalf of intersex children, where the State’s attempts to protect the
child’s best interests can instead cause irreparable harm to the child’s body
and ability to define and realize their2 own identity.

*

Benjamin Sweeney is a third-year law student at Seattle University School of Law. His
experience is in gender-based and lgbt political theory, which informs his legal
perspective. He would like to thank the Seattle Journal of Social Justice for affording
him the opportunity to add to the discussion of intersex rights.
1
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 303 (Alan
Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
2
Current linguistic conventions do not provide a clear means of resolving the conflict
between third person singular pronouns and ambiguities of sex and gender. In lieu of the
binary-reaffirming “his or her,” or somewhat unfamiliar gender-neutral pronouns I will
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Prior to December 11, 2006, M.C. was a ward of the State of South
Carolina.3 M.C.’s mother had been declared unfit and her parental rights
had been terminated, while M.C.’s father’s parental rights were terminated
as a result of abandonment.4 While under the State’s care, medical staff
determined that M.C. exhibited “true hermaphroditism,” that is, possessed
ambiguous genitalia such that a sex determination as male or female was
unclear.5 Physicians recommended that M.C. undergo surgical alteration in
order to appear female, and the State approved the procedure.6 The
operating physician removed all of M.C.’s testicular tissue and removed
most of his phallus in order to create the appearance of a clitoris.7 M.C. was
16 months old.8 Throughout this process, Pamela and John Mark Crawford
were navigating the foster parent and adoption systems, and formally
adopted M. C. on December 11, 2006.9 Despite their efforts to adopt M.C.,
at no point were Mr. and Mrs. Crawford involved in the decision to subject
M.C. to this surgery.10
Years after surgery, M.C. began exhibiting traits much more common in
little boys than in little girls.11 For example, M.C. chose to play with trucks

be using gender neutral third person plural when referring to individuals without
demonstrated gender identity.
3
Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303, 2013 WL 1961775 (D.S.C. May 14,
2013).
4
Id.
5
Id.; Answer to Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303, 2013 WL 5000957
(D.S.C. May 14, 2013).
6
Complaint, supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, YOUTUBE.COM (May 14,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qH4P5PtC4w&feature=youtu.be.
11
Id. This article assumes several presumptions and overgeneralizations regarding gender
expression and identity that deserve a more nuanced and detailed analysis. Chief among
them is the presumption that certain traits and behaviors are typologically gendered. For
more detailed discussion about the origins, nature and consequences of this method of
categorization, this author recommends: THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Cobblestones of Good Intentions

and action figures, rather than with dolls.12 Today, M.C. is living as a boy
with the full support of his family and community, but his physical body is
configured such that it does not reflect his gender identity.13 Medical
science is unable to repair much of what was taken from him, such as his
ability to procreate.14 M.C. and his parents brought a lawsuit in May of
2013 against the medical personnel who participated in M.C.’s surgery and
the State of South Carolina, accusing them of medical malpractice and of
violating M.C.’s substantive due process rights.15
The plaintiffs’ legal theory in M.C. v. Aaronson provides the impetus for
this analysis.16 Can a substantive due process analysis serve as a suitable
legal tool to accomplish justice in intersex cases? This article’s response to
that inquiry is that surgical sex assignment of intersex children is a violation
of their rights provided through substantive due process. The capacity to
determine and express one’s identity is fundamentally shaped by a physical
sexual assignment. The oppression of a child’s ability to identify and
experience their gender and sex expression constitutes injustice; infant sex
assignment surgeries performed for the bare purpose of reinforcing cultural
boundaries should not enjoy the endorsement of the law as an adequate
interest of the state. The Supreme Court should recognize and protect the
individual right to freedom from harmful and unnecessary surgery for this
purpose. Unfortunately, current US jurisprudence does not adequately
address many of the harms suffered by intersex persons. Where substantive
GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Trans., Robert Hurley, 1990).
12
The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10.
13
Complaint, supra note 3; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case,
supra note 10.
14
Id.; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2-13-cv01303, 2013 WL 5000957 (D.S.C. 2013), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/
default/files/ downloads/case/order_denying_def._motion_to_dismiss_0.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2014).
15
See Complaint, supra note 3; Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2013CP4002877,
2013 WL 2143761 (S.C.Com.Pl. May 14, 2013).
16
See Complaint, supra note 3.
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due process does not provide adequate recourse, affirmative legislation
barring the practice of infant sex assignment should be drafted to protect the
rights of the intersex infants.
First, I will provide the backdrop for my reasoning of how the District
Court should decide M.C. v. Aaronson through a close analysis of the
relevant contexts surrounding intersexed persons, gender and sex norms,
and medical practice. Second, I will examine the particular facts of M.C. v.
Aaronson, including the framing of the discussion by the parties involved.
Third, I will discuss a just resolution of the substantive due process claim,
both in M.C. v. Aaronson and in a more general context. Fourth, I will take
this discussion and the emergent reasoning and apply them to local
constitutional rights law, analyzing the capacity for protecting
Washingtonian intersex infants through use of the state constitution’s article
I, section 3 protections. Fifth, I will consider the jurisprudential limits of
substantive due process claims, which are, unfortunately, inadequate to
address the core roots of harm that are evinced in cases like M.C. v.
Aaronson. Acknowledging this, I will end my discussion by considering
legislative and non-jurisprudential resolutions to these harms, inviting
further analysis about how to best further justice for intersex persons. 17
A. Legal Analysis Concerning Intersex Persons
M.C.’s story is not an isolated circumstance. Somewhere between one
hundred and two hundred surgeries of this type are performed each year.
Though the physicians in M.C.’s case referred to him as “hermaphroditic,”
modern terminology would consider him to have been born intersex.18
Though bright-line definitions quickly become problematic, generally,
“‘Intersex’ is a . . . term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is
17
Sara A. Aliabadi, Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the
Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both Supports and Opposes a Moratorium, 12
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 179 (2004).
18
Complaint, supra note 3.
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born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the
typical definitions of female or male.”19 Any attempt to effectuate justice
must include an examination of M.C.’s circumstances while also bearing in
mind the surrounding social, cultural, and medical contexts. Any legal
solution that does not do so runs the risk of confounding justice through
poor reasoning and shortsightedness.
Both in this case and generally, justice requires that we recognize that
surgical sex assignment of intersex children is a violation of their rights
provided through substantive due process. Fundamental components of an
individual’s rights, such as the capacity to determine and express one’s
identity, are restricted by external physical sexual assignment. Not only is
the limitation of a child’s freedoms and opportunities offensive to their
rights, the decision to reify narrow cultural boundaries in the bodies of
unwitting infants is an act of injustice. For these reasons, the Supreme Court
should recognize that the individual right to freedom from harmful and
unnecessary surgeries of this type is protected as a substantive due process
right.
Much of the discussion in M.C.’s case involves analysis of gender, sex
identity, and gender identity in the legal context. Because these are
academically robust topics, I will not attempt to condense, or even localize,
all of the theories and perspectives available for analysis. For the sake of
discussion, I assume certain definitions and understandings with the
awareness that these definitions and understandings do not reflect all
persons’ realities.
While other works are able to provide a more robust discussion of the
contrast between sex and gender, this article assumes a basic and
generalized distinction. For the purposes of this article, I acknowledge the
generally accepted definition of sex as “[t]he biological and physiological

19
What is Intersex?, THE INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, http://www.isna.
org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
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differences between males and females[,]” though the very premise of this
paper challenges the underlying assumptions of that definition.20 Generally,
gender is considered the more fluid of the two, as a categorization that is
“socially constructed by a particular society and ascribes . . . norms to
individuals within that society . . . [and] is a process that may vary and
reflects sociocultural expectations.”21
Both gender and sex are important considerations within this discussion,
but the topic of intersex rights (and discussion of M.C.’s specific harms) has
a great deal to do with sex and gender identity. Gender identity, a concept
gaining more widespread recognition, is widely considered the
understanding of the self as male or female as measured by social norms
and practices.22 Sex identity, on the other hand, challenges the immutability
and plasticity of sex and gender as defined above. Sex identity is one’s
understanding of the self as immutably, often biologically, male or female,
“[w]hile gender identity is understood as a cultural phenomenon, which
may have elements of artificial construction, you’ve ‘got to be real,’ (i.e.,
naturally binary), when it comes to [sex] identity.”23
In other words, M.C.’s gender and gender identity are relatively easily
understood as male, as measured by his coopting of social norms. The
definition of M.C.’s sex is problematized due to “ambiguous genitalia,” but
physical realities, as we see in his case, can be modified through procedures
such as surgery. Absent further surgery, M.C.’s “immutable” nature is
female, and he could therefore be considered female under a classic
definition of sex. Any definition of M.C.’s sex identity, however, is bound
to be much more tenuous than a definition of his sex. M.C.’s sex identity
cannot conform to sex-binary narratives and any attempt to establish a
20

HEESOON JUN, SOCIAL JUSTICE, MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING, AND PRACTICE 127
(Kassie Graves et al. eds., SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010).
21
Id. at 127–28.
22
Id. at 128.
23
Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Reform, 88 N.C. L. REV. 357,
366 (2010).
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“male” or “female” label would be categorically flawed. This is because
sex-binary narratives presuppose a first nature as either male or female that
existed separately from physical sex. In order to fully understand the impact
of the law and the social order it condones or censors, we must disregard the
allure of looking at sex identity through binary narratives and intersexuality
must be considered a sex identity on par with male or female sex identities.
B. The Importance of Sex Identity: More Than Just Modified Gender
Identity
Expression of one’s sex identity is integral to operation within our
present day social systems. Vital life events require affirmation of sex
identity. The experiences of transsexual persons, who express gender
identities that can conflict with their physical sex, have highlighted the
dissonance created when one attempts to assert a sex identity that does not
conform to one’s assigned sex.24 A lack of a societally acknowledged sex
identity can have severe consequences for an individual including the
failure of parents to relate to them, alienation from society, the perception of
embarrassment around the topic of their sex or gender, and fragmentation of
their family systems.25
These interpersonal harms are the result of pervasive social systems,
specifically of rigid narratives about binary sex and sex identity that
eliminate the possibility of recognizing intersex as a valid sex identity.
Conformity with binary narratives is, presumably, one method of
eliminating these harms, but this is not truly viable when the nonconformity is the result of “immutable” sex identities.26 Many intersex

24

See, e.g., id. at 366.
See Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics, and the Law, 11
ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 230–31 (2002) (discussing studies that indicate that, despite
surgical alterations, many families had significant difficulties in processing the fact that
their child was intersex).
26
But see id. at 230–33 (recommending that children be gendered, presumably alongside
a binary gender structure, because we live in a gendered society; the premise being that
25
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activists have analogized the repression of intersex reality to the political
struggles of queer persons to “pursue freedom from normative gender
constructions.”27 Not only does the existence of intersex persons disrupt the
tendency of society and law to view the world “in binary terms—of color or
white, gay or straight,” but it threatens the immutability and naturalness of
binary sex, a cornerstone of mutually exclusive dichotomies.28
C. Substantive Due Process as a Means to Protecting Intersex Persons
In M.C. v. Aaronson, M.C.’s remedy lies largely in his substantive due
process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution provides
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.”29 The concept of substantive due process as a general
remedy to protect intersex persons from deprivations of liberty is tempting,
given that the jurisprudence surrounding substantive due process limits the
capacity for pervasive and majoritarian prejudices to infringe on
minorities.30 In reality, however, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
explicitly expand the “discrete and insular minority” categorization to cover
intersex persons, given other recent, gender-based Supreme Court cases
dealing with fundamental rights.31 This does not rule out substantive due
process as a legal protection against the harms that M.C. suffered, but any
protection will likely need to come from more generalized loci than
“discrete and insular minority” protection. As will be discussed in more
conformity to a gendered binary, a reflection of a binary sex, will help mitigate the social
harms intersex persons are subject to).
27
DEBORAH T. MEEM ET AL., FINDING OUT: AN INTRODUCTION TO LGBT STUDIES 183
(Todd R. Armstrong et al. eds., SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010).
28
Id. at 4.
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
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detail, the individual rights to be asserted can fall under a variety of
categorizations derived from substantive due process jurisprudence.

I. INTERSEX CONTEXTUALIZED
Unlike populations identified via race or binary sex, intersex individuals
do not occupy a space in the community discourse. Any discussion of
solutions must first begin with an understanding of the harms that the
solutions seek to address. This can be difficult in the context of intersex
persons, as there often is not sufficient background information present in
the academic or legal discourse to appreciate the harms that cultural and
legal systems impose on intersex persons. A level of understanding is
integral to the empathy and awareness needed, not only to understand the
harms, but also to meaningfully weigh solutions and their resultant impacts.
A. Defining Intersex
Intersexuality remains ambiguously defined both medically and socially,
and this imprecision creates difficulties in discussing how law and policy
should assess the needs of intersex persons.32 The imprecision of social
definitions comes from a lack of universally held standards upon which
groups can agree. Without a clear, objective standard, the term “intersex” is
used very generally to describe people living in a state of sexual otherness.33
The medical definition reflects this vagueness by defining intersex as “a
group of conditions where there is a discrepancy between the external
genitals and the internal genitals (the testes and ovaries)”34 and failing to
32

See What is Intersex?, supra note 19 (offering the generalized description of intersex as
“a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a
reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical definitions of female
or male[,]” but acknowledging that definition of intersex can become “a semantic game
that never ends”).
33
See id.
34
Neil K. Kaneshiro, Intersex, MEDLINE PLUS (August 2, 2011), http://www.nlm.nih.
gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001669.htm (emphasis added) (It is intrinsically unclear
what discrepancies are being measured against, and without appeal to an externally
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take into account the significant cultural narratives at work. There are a
variety of circumstances in which an individual would manifest ambiguity
in regard to binary sexual assignment, and therefore demonstrate such a
“discrepancy.” For example, an otherwise “female” infant could exhibit
male gonad development during gestation, something that is potentially
apparent by external observation.35 However, the definition could also
include infants who possess Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome,
where the hormone receptors do not process androgen the same way that
other XY chromosome (“male”) humans do.36 Because of this definitional
imprecision there is no definitive or universally recognized figure for the
number of intersex persons born or living.37 Therefore, intersex births could
range anywhere from one in 100 births to being a practical impossibility.38
However, most experts place the figure somewhere between one in 1,500 to
one in 2,000 births, using the definition of intersex as “so noticeably
atypical in terms of genitalia that a specialist in sex differentiation is called
in.”39
B. Harmful Narratives: Specific Challenges Faced by Intersex Persons in
Narrative Exclusion
Intersex persons face a variety of difficulties relating to the restraints
imposed by medical and social sex binaries. The scope of this paper
encompasses the specific harms that are imposed upon the 1.7–4 percent of
the world’s population that are born with primary or secondary sexual
characteristics that are not clearly male or female.40 It is these infants who
imposed conception of sexual binary, excludes many of those considered to be intersex
by virtue of “sexual ambiguity”).
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
How Common is Intersex?, THE INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA,
http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
38
See id.
39
Id.
40
Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41 (2004).
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are the potential subjects of sex assignment surgery.41 An estimated 100–
200 such sex assignment surgeries occur each year in the United States.42
As will be discussed in greater detail, there is a clear social component to
the designation of intersex persons as a group that, temporarily or
permanently, exists outside of a rigid sex-binary. However, for a variety of
reasons, it is difficult to classify intersex persons as a social group, rather
than as a class sharing certain medical or physiological traits.43
Identification with a gender and a sex is presumed, with intersex being a
temporary condition prior to transition into an immutable and “real” sex.44
Even where surgical alterations are not performed immediately, intersex
children are still expected to conform to a binary sex identity, to which their
bodies will later be brought into conformity.45
There is very limited information about the psychological wellbeing of
individuals who undergo this alteration.46 This lack of information coincides
with the sublimation of intersex as a “real” sex identity. The goal of
normalizing renders the normalized invisible and relatively disabled from
advocacy or redress. As a result, one of the harms associated with infant sex
assignment is the sublimation that occurs; where doctors attempt to “cure”
intersexuality in infancy there is greater difficulty in establishing
intersexuality as a legitimate sex identity.47
Like other areas of gender, sex, and sexuality, intersex has been present
throughout human history, but this is not immediately apparent. Intersex
persons can be found in the cultural histories of our own and other

41

Id.
Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 179.
43
Haas, supra note 40.
44
See Bloom, supra note 23, at 365–66.
45
See Hermer, supra note 25, at 208–11.
46
See id. at 212.
47
See RIKI WILCHINS, QUEER THEORY, GENDER THEORY: AN INSTANT PRIMER 77–78
(Riki Wilchins, ed., 1st ed. 2004) (demonstrating that “[t]hrough a series of silences and
erasures” the political and social power of one identity is transferred to a new identity).
42
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societies.48 The impulse to consider intersex as a “new” medical
categorization, rather than a “natural” state, is more the result of modern
cultural zeitgeist than objective scientific fact.49 There is historical
precedent to support an alternative to eliminating intersex persons through
surgical alteration. Historical sources indicate that medical, legal, and social
authorities found ways to reconcile intersex persons with the gendered
environment in which the world operated.50 At a basic level, “surgeries
[serve] no purpose except to make the intersexed child more appealing to
parents and to their culture,”51 with the only benefits being collateral to
conformity with a narrative that ignores an individual’s personal reality.
Therefore, if the harms of infant surgical assignment outweigh the benefits,
further harm through continued surgeries should be prevented on this basis.
C. Medical Treatment of Intersex Persons
Modern medical practice has supported the normalization of intersex
bodies through surgery since the 1950s.52 For the last 60–70 years, the birth
of an intersex child has been considered a medical emergency.53 The
prevailing medical perspective has been largely based on the studies of Dr.
John Money, a psychologist who, in 1967, began a radical experiment in
infant sex assignment. Dr. Money’s study involved Bruce Reimer, an infant
whose penis was mutilated beyond repair following circumcision
complications.54 At Dr. Money’s recommendation, Bruce underwent genital
48

Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 76–77 (2006).
49
Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 469, 471
(2001).
50
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 76–77.
51
MEEM ET AL., supra note 27.
52
See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Medical and Ethical
Dilemma: Should Physicans Perfrom Sex Assignments on Infants with Ambiguous
Genitalia?, 7 Mich. J. of Gender & L. 1, 2–3 (2000).
53
Tamar Mattis, supra note 48, at 65.
54
Id. at 59–60.
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construction surgery to simulate female genital appearance and his parents
were instructed to raise him as “Brenda,” complete with typical gender
socializing parenting techniques, a hormone regimen, and complete secrecy
about Brenda’s sex assignment.55 Dr. Money’s report indicated that the
experiment was a great success. Brenda, according to the report, followed
normatively feminine patterns of behavior (for example, the study
emphasized that Brenda played with dolls instead of trucks) in contrast to
her twin brother, who followed normatively masculine patterns of
behavior.56
Though Bruce was not born intersex, physicians began using Dr.
Money’s study to support their recommendations to parents of intersex
children.57 Following Dr. Money’s model, doctors routinely prescribed
“normalizing” genital surgery, hormone treatment, and secrecy about the
child’s sexual ambiguity.58 Reflecting the importance of concealment and
immediate normalization to this treatment method, the American Academy
of Pediatricians has, until recently, described the birth of an intersex infant
as a “social emergency.”59 In selecting a sex to assign, physicians consider a
variety of factors, though none are dispositive.60 These factors include
chromosomal patterns, future reproductive capacity, and “positive surgical
outcome.”61 Often times surgeons will recommend that a child be surgically
altered along female guidelines because “it [is] far easier to make a
functional female than a male.”62
Even where the ease of the surgical process is not dispositive, it is clear
that, when making their recommendations to parents or—as in the case of

55

Id.
Id. at 60.
57
Id.
58
Id.; Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 178; Haas, supra note 40, at 45.
59
Bloom, supra note 23, at 404.
60
See, e.g., Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 66.
61
Id.
62
Id. (emphasis added).
56
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M.C.—the state guardian, surgeons project their own perspectives of gender
and sex narratives. For example, when considering the “functionality” of
the assigned genital-type, physicians follow antiquated and patriarchal
conceptions of binary sex roles.63 Specifically, suitable male sex organs are
those which can, at maturity, penetrate a vagina, while suitable female sex
organs are able to be penetrated by a penis.64 The stark prioritization of
“normalcy” as the predominant factor in the interests of the child is very
clear in early clitoridectomy of children with “abnormally” large clitorises
that were not able to be modified into a phallus.65 Modern surgeries
generally attempt to preserve as many nerve clusters as possible, but the
underlying premise of doctors’ decisions to remove “abnormally” large
clitorises (which are massive nerve clusters) is that social “normalcy” is
more important to the wellbeing of the child than nerve sensation.66
These procedures are all performed with the hope that the child and
family will ultimately benefit from the child’s smoother integration into an
assigned sex and gender. However, the hallmark study that supported these
concealment methods was based on inherently misleading grounds. Over
the course of his research, Dr. Money failed to publish the troubling signs
that his method was not working as well as he had hoped. Brenda exhibited
a variety of male traits beyond the mild “tomboyishness” reported by Dr.
Money, including standing to urinate and demanding, at age fourteen, to be
allowed to live as a boy.67 When his parents responded by telling him about

63

JOCELYN ELDERS & DAVID CHANOFF, JOYCELYN ELDERS, M.D.: FROM
SHARECROPPER’S DAUGHTER TO SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 153 (1996) (quoted in Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the
Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 66
(2006)) (emphasis added).
64
See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 66.
65
Id.
66
See Karen Gurney, Sex and the Surgeon’s Knife: The Family Court’s Dilemma.
Informed Consent and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex
Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L & MED. 625, 633 (2007).
67
Id.
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the procedure, he underwent surgery and began living as a man until he
ended his life by committing suicide in 2004.68 The true results of Dr.
Money’s method were not published until 1997.69
Without an empirically verifiable benefit, in terms of synthesizing a
person’s identity and body with an assigned sex identity, Dr. Money’s
concealment method could not provide adequate justification for the variety
of harms that came to light regarding infant sex assignment surgery and the
concealment method generally. Similar to cultural genital cutting (for
example, female circumcision, sometimes called female genital mutilation),
sex assignment surgeries can irreparably damage nerve systems and impede
sexual functioning or enjoyment.70 Intersex infants can have their
reproductive functions irreversibly eliminated.71 Finally, even the basic goal
of integrating children into “normalcy” is frustrated when “the surgeries and
repeated medical displays of the child’s genitals can themselves be sources
of a deep and lasting sense of shame[,]” and continued surgical and
hormonal treatments interrupt their day-to-day lives.72
D. Modern Responses and Advocacy for Intersex Persons
In response to increased awareness about the misinformed and harmful
practices being performed on intersex infants, intersex advocacy groups
began to organize and seek policy changes.73 The Intersex Society of North
America was founded in 1994 by Cheryl Chase specifically to address
medically localized injustices against intersex persons.74 Activists have
68

Samantha S. Uslan, What Parents Don’t Know: Informed Consent, Marriage, and
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children, 85 IND. L.J. 301, 302–03 (2010).
69
Id. at 303.
70
See Hermer, supra note 25, at 203.
71
Julie Greenberg, Marybeth Herald, & Mark Strasser, Beyond the Binary: What Can
Feminists Learn From Intersex and Transgender Jurisprudence?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 13, 38 (2009); Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 91.
72
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 72.
73
Id. at 72–73.
74
See, e.g. WILCHINS, supra note 47, at 77.

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014

167

168 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

drawn on many political and philosophical perspectives used by LGBT,
transgender, and queer-rights activists, emphasizing the importance of
individual identity expression, tolerance of difference, and freedom from
restrictive social identity narratives.75
While activists have thus far had some successes, such as in the education
of the public and of medical professionals, there have not been significant
legal responses to the current medical standard of care or the rights of
intersex persons.76 Society and its laws recognize binary options for gender
and sex identification.77
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the ways in which
binary sex structures are represented and reinforced within the cultures and
laws of the United States. However, certain international family courts have
begun to reject arguments that sex is immutable in the context of youth
transsexualism, and are more willing to recognize and tolerate plans for
intersex youths to acquire treatment for erroneous sex assignment.78 While
these holdings do not create specific protections against sex assignment,
they do demonstrate legally cognizable theories of sex identity as a
legitimate interest; while the binary is upheld, the immutability of sex is
thrown into question. These victories carve out space for further argument
and advocacy about the importance of individual sex identification and
freedom from restrictive structures that restrict this identification.
These small cracks in the legal and cultural narratives are overshadowed
by ubiquitous affirmations of natural, immutable, and binary sex. While
certain courts may be receptive to circumstances in which an individual is
clearly being harmed by their inability to express their gender and sex
75

Cheryl Chase, What is the Agenda of the Intersex Patient Advocacy Movement?, THE
INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (June 23, 2004), http://www.isna.org/agenda.
76
See MEEM ET AL., supra note 27, at 185; see Gurney, supra note 66, at n.34.
77
Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 179–80.
78
See Jennifer Rellis, “Please Write ‘E’ In This Box” Toward Self-Identification and
Recognition of a Third Gender: Approaches in the United States and India, 14 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 223, 242 (2008).
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identity, legislative and executive actors continue to reaffirm restrictive
narratives. One example of this is the Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) regulations surrounding silicone gel implants. In response to
litigation concerning the health hazards of silicone gel implants, the FDA
declared a moratorium on all use of these implants, except in cases where
they were being used to reconstruct breasts lost to mastectomy.79 The FDA
rationalized this distinction by citing the psychological and emotional needs
of these recipients.80 This exception indicates the FDA’s acceptance of
delineation between “natural” and “unnatural,” presuming that “natural”
women would experience an emotional or psychological harm from the
absence or loss of their breasts that would not be experienced by those who
were not born into the female side of the sex-binary.81
These obstacles in the political arena highlight the reality that any
protection that specifically addresses intersex persons is most likely going
to come from the courts. Even then, relying on or building on transgenderfocused legal remedies may not be the most effective avenue for change, as
legal evaluation of transgender persons tends to reassert the existence of a
sex-binary, even as the immutability of placement within that binary is
eroded.82 For this reason, protections based on sex identity must originate
from other jurisprudential loci than protections centered on gender
identity.83
Recognizing the unique nature of intersex persons in the context of their
personal realities and the social narratives that surround them, it is now
possible to focus analysis on the specific facts of M.C. v. Aaronson.
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See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 66, at 644–51.
Bloom, supra note 23, at 409.
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See id. at 382.
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II. M.C. V. AARONSON
M.C.’s biological father and mother both relinquished their parental
rights, so determinations in the interest of M.C.’s wellbeing were left to the
State. While he was a ward of the State, medical professionals discovered
that M.C. fell into the medical definition of intersex in that he had
characteristics of both male and female reproductive organs,84 both
externally and internally (this circumstance is medically defined as
“ovotesticular difference” or DSD).85 After recommendations by medical
practitioners, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS)
approved surgically altering M.C. to create the appearance of female
genitalia.86 Personnel within the DSS did all the paperwork, processing, and
decision making.87
Physicians used extensive surgical methods to modify M.C.’s body. As a
part of the procedure, physicians removed M.C.’s external testicular tissue
and the partial testicular tissue on his internal gonads.88 Physicians also
made additional surgical alterations to encourage the appearance of female
genitalia, including the removal of M.C.’s phallus.89 These alterations
effectively sterilized M.C., who would have potentially had the capacity to
produce viable sperm.90 The Crawfords gained custody of and adopted
M.C., intending to raise him as a girl according to his gender assignment.91
84

At this point it is constructive to point out that the use of masculine pronouns is a
reflection of M.C.’s gender identity as male, not a reflection of any inherent maleness
that stems from sex or sex identity.
85
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 2, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv01303 at 2 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/
files/downloads/case/order_denying_def._motion_to_dismiss_0.pdf.
86
Complaint, supra note 3, at 49; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra
note 85, at 3.
87
Complaint, supra note 3, at 39; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra
note 85, at 3.
88
Complaint, supra note 3, at 51; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra
note 85, at 3.
89
Id.; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra note 85, at 3.
90
Complaint, supra note 3, at 51.
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Id.; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10.
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However, as time went on, M.C. did not act in accordance with his
assigned gender and instead began developing a more masculine gender
identity (measured according to the mannerisms, interests, and play styles
that are culturally associated with male gender identification).92 As M.C.’s
gender identity developed more clearly along masculine lines, his parents
recognized the limitations that had been imposed on him through early sex
assignment and joined with the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) to file
complaints in federal and state courts against South Carolina and the
physicians for violating M.C.’s fundamental rights.93
A. Goals of Litigation: Allegations of the Complaint
M.C.’s parents have said that the purpose of the lawsuit is to uphold
constitutional principles protecting infants from an imposition of “correct”
sex characteristics and protecting the integrity of their bodies.94 While
groundbreaking, the legal argument offered by SPLC fell short of an
argument for an individual right to be intersex.95
The plaintiffs’ complaints forwarded several theories of why the
surgeries performed on M.C. were violations of his fundamental rights.
Rather than highlighting that M.C. was born intersex, they emphasized the
limitations on his expression of his gender identity.96 M.C.’s parents alleged
that the defendant physicians and DSS officials could not have known if
M.C.’s identity would develop as a man or as a woman.97 This argument
92

Complaint, supra note 3, at 13; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex
Case, supra note 10.
93
M.C. v. Aaronson, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sep. 16, 2014) www.splcenter.
org/get-informed/case-docket/mc-v-aaronson.
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The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10.
95
This foregone argument essentially argues that a person has a right to sex identification
outside of binary sex. Many of the same personal liberty interests asserted within this
article could be brought to bear on this argument, particularly since limitation to binary
sex forms the paradigmatic basis for assigning a sex to intersex infants in the first place.
96
Complaint, supra note 3 (characterizing the harm as the mis-assignment of a female sex
upon M.C., and the limitations imposed on him as a male because of surgery).
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Id. at 49.
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acknowledges the lack of credibility in Dr. Money’s concealment method; if
physicians are aware that gender identity cannot be imposed through
concealment, socialization, and hormone treatment, then they should also be
aware that gender identity can develop independent of surgically assigned
sex. Additionally, the plaintiffs for M.C. asserted that surgery could have
been postponed either until M.C. was able to make an informed decision on
his own or until more observational data could be collected about M.C.’s
gender identification.98
Both of the complaints submitted by the plaintiffs address errors made by
physicians, but ordinary medical malpractice does not necessarily
substantiate a substantive due process claim. The surgery performed on
M.C. was not subject to a hearing or robust legal determination that
weighed potential harms to M.C.99 Medical personnel made their own
determinations and recommendations and the DSS officials consented, on
behalf of M.C., to the recommended treatment options.100 The plaintiffs
argued that M.C.’s fundamental, substantive due process rights were
violated when the state gave its approval for the irreversible medical
procedure without investigating its necessity.101
As mentioned previously, the plaintiffs did not emphasize a fundamental
right to ambiguous sex identity. Rather, they argued that M.C. had a
“fundamental right to bodily integrity, privacy, liberty and procreation.”102
The plaintiffs implicated M.C.’s more general rights (or liberty interests) as
being broad enough to protect his particular vulnerabilities as an intersex
person instead of creating an entirely new categorization of fundamental
rights.103
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Id.
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The plaintiffs also alleged statutory tort claims against the physicians
under South Carolina law.104 Though the statutory claims arise under state
law, constitutional limitations necessarily affect the extent to which state
law can operate to curtail a person’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Many
of the same harms that are addressed through a substantive due process
claim, such as loss of procreative rights, freedom of choice, or future
enjoyment, can also be addressed via medical torts.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs in M.C. v. Aaronson emphasized the
deleterious impact of the surgery on M.C.’s gender identity expression. In
general, there is no discussion in the complaint of any specific rights that
are tied to M.C.’s status as intersex. This creates the paradoxical situation in
which the theory of harm is based on M.C.’s fundamental right to express
his male gender identity. The complaint goes so far as to emphasize that
M.C. was originally categorized by physicians as male prior to the
determination that he should be assigned a female sex.105
B. The Answer to the Complaint: Framing of the Discussion
The defendants’ approach to the case differs from the plaintiffs’ in that it
focuses on M.C.’s intersexuality as a justification for their behavior. The
defendants acknowledge M.C.’s male gender identity, but emphasize M.C.
as a person of “ambiguous” physical sex.106 Their perspective seems to be
that M.C.’s “ambiguous genitalia” indicated that things could have gone
either way.107 The defendants thus frame the case as one where they were
asked to anticipate the development of a gender identity, and where the
court is now asked to decide whether the physicians would or should have
been able to anticipate the development of a male gender identity. If the
legal argument is characterized in that manner, then there is little
104

Complaint, supra note 15, at 13–14.
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107
See id.
105

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014

173

174 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

jurisprudential benefit to intersex persons as a whole, as body-modifying
surgery would be appropriate where a child developed a gender identity to
match their assigned sex.
Research is still limited, but preliminary results indicate that surgical
alteration (the concealment method specifically) does not significantly
impact the direction of gender identity development.108 If the legal remedy
and protection for intersex persons hinges on whether physicians are able to
accurately predict the gender identity (or avoid liability when there is no
clear indication of binary sex identity to correspond to gender identity), then
intersex persons will only have a legal recourse when physicians can be
shown to have been negligent in predicting a child’s eventual gender
identity. This conception of a remedy is unreasonable for the very reason
that infant surgical sex assignment is unreasonable for intersex persons: the
formation of gender identity cannot be determined at such a young age.109
The defendants’ position precludes an appropriate substantive due
process claim, while the plaintiffs’ position limits the viability of using
substantive due process in a variety of circumstances. A theory that
incorporates a wider application of substantive due process would better
serve the needs of intersex persons by providing remedies and protections
from unnecessary surgery.

III. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
A. Theory of Fundamental Rights: Bodily Integrity, Privacy, Liberty, and
Procreation
A more expansive and inclusive set of rights is not only preferable to
address the specific contextual needs of intersex persons, but is
constitutionally viable as well. There is no exhaustive list of what
fundamental rights are protected under the US Constitution, nor are there
108
109
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finite limits on how those rights can be triggered or exercised.110 Generally,
however, the Supreme Court has considered substantive rights to be
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where
the practices protected are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such
that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed.”111
These rights or protected practices must also be “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”112 If the right is too imprecisely defined or
abstract, it will not gain judicial acceptance, though this seems to pertain
more to the application of the right to a definite practice than the wider
application of a general right.113
In addition to recognizing an explicit due process protection against
sterilization, courts have recognized due process rights to privacy, liberty,
and preservation of bodily integrity as part of a more abstract scope of
rights.114 Though there are distinct jurisprudential differences between these
rights, they would operate in a similar fashion in the context of protecting
intersex persons from infant sex assignment surgery. Approaching them
together has strategic benefit as well, as there are “[n]umerous court
decisions [that] support the general contention that on a fundamental level,
the right to privacy protects an individual’s right to be free from unwanted
invasion of his or her person.”115 The Supreme Court has also emphasized
the interconnectedness of these rights, holding that the substantive due
process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment include the “most basic
decisions about family and parenthood, . . . as well as bodily integrity.”116
110

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (indicating that the
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The plaintiffs’ complaint claims that the violation of substantive due
process takes four distinct forms.117 They assert that M.C. has rights of
bodily integrity, privacy, liberty, and procreation, and that all of these were
infringed upon as result of his sex assignment surgery.118 These distinctions
and categorizations are useful in distinguishing exactly what rights are
threatened by infant sex assignment surgery, but they are not equally
applicable to all intersex persons.
First, both bodily integrity and privacy could fairly easily be applied to
most intersex persons subjected to surgical alteration. Surgery is necessarily
invasive of a person’s privacy and bodily integrity. Liberty, a more general
right, can be elusive in definition. Certainly the right could reiterate the
liberty of being free from unnecessary surgery, but the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment can also encompass “the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.”119 Because of the wider potential application of the liberty
right under the Fourteenth Amendment, it could encompass the right to
decide one’s gender or even sex identity. Some theorists note that modern
jurisprudence is becoming considerably more open to justifying rights to
alternative gender and sex identities in the context of the liberty
protection.120 However, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court would
allow for a fundamental right to identify outside of a deeply ingrained legal
narrative such as binary sex identification. The final right identified is the
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right to procreation.121 This is, perhaps, the strongest argument put forward
by the Plaintiffs in M.C. v. Aaronson, as it is the most narrowly applicable
and unambiguous right.122 In removing M.C.’s testicular tissue, the doctors
removed any chance he had to reproduce.123 However, not all intersex
persons share M.C.’s initial capacity for reproduction in the first place.124
Additionally, this remedy would necessarily exclude intersex persons whose
reproductive function is preserved.
A protection centered on reproduction and procreative rights would likely
have the impact of encouraging intersex surgical alterations to eliminate sex
traits that do not coincide with potential reproductive function. A remedy
limited to this right would be under-inclusive, as it would not protect the
interests of intersex persons who do not identify with their “procreative
sex.” Emphasis on procreative rights also encourages a perspective on sex
identity as being limited to binary reproductive roles. Finally, a procreative
right would exclude those intersex persons who do not have an easily
observable “dominant” reproductive function.125
The court order dismissing the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment limited its discussion to the procreative right.126 Though the
District Court was not required to discuss the liberty, bodily integrity, and
privacy rights asserted for the purposes of addressing a summary judgment
motion, the court’s sole emphasis on procreative rights could indicate that it
is more receptive to arguments about procreative rights than about other,
more inclusive rights.
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While there may be merit to a more incremental approach to
jurisprudence that considers the rights of intersex persons, reliance on
protection from sterilization is inadequate as a remedy. Though there is
value to asserting generalized and widely-recognized individual rights, it
would not protect intersex infants from genital-altering sex assignment
surgery. Even if an intersex infant possessed the biological capacity for
reproduction and developed a gender identity that “matched” their
reproductively based sex, they still would be subject to genital normalizing
surgery that would threaten their future sexual enjoyment and psychological
wellbeing.
However, any remedy that relies upon a nexus between reproductive
capacity and sex identity will be of little use to one whose gender identity
does not conform to their reproductively based assigned sex. In the
circumstance where a child does not identify with the sex that corresponded
to their reproductive capacity, the child would be precluded from any sort of
legal remedy, while still incurring all of non-reproductive harms associated
with sex assigned surgery. For example, if physicians had identified M.C.’s
potential male fertility and surgically modified him to appear male, then
M.C. would have no remedy under this theory if he had developed a female
gender identity. In these circumstances we must question what the value of
procreative capacity is when one would be forced to transgress a
fundamental component of their identity in order to exercise that right. A
weighing of these rights, absent the wishes and expressed interests of the
individual is a hazardous task; any surgical alteration should therefore be
delayed until the intersex person is able to weigh these interests on their
own.
B. Viability of a Substantive Due Process Remedy
Recent US Supreme Court cases have not only integrated the discussion
of these various, similar interests in their application of substantive due
process, but have also been using an approach to substantive due process
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rights in the individual, sexually non-normative sense to expand rights to
marginalized communities.127 In these more modern cases, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the liberty interests of certain individuals were
protected from targeted deprivation.128 As a matter of definition, intersex
persons are uniquely targeted by binary sex imposition. Indeed, the nature
of an intersex person is one who is physiologically differentiated from
binary sex.129
On the other hand, the Court’s discussion in United States v. Windsor
acknowledges the applicability of substantive due process in the context of
state protections for individuals. This is due, at least in some part, to the
conflict specific to Windsor.130 However, because the Supreme Court has
not explicitly established a protection doctrine that would apply
independent of state protections, intersex persons might be unable to
exercise this federal due process right where the state has not established
legal protections to cover them.131 Regardless of the merits of this
argument, it would behoove advocates to consider the state rules as an
alternate mechanism of redress. Alternatively, the state rules could be used
to could be used to expand jurisprudential consideration for groups and
practices traditionally excluded from substantive due process protection.
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United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574 (2003).
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See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; Romer v. Evans,
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id. at 2695–96.
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IV. CONTRASTING WASHINGTON’S INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY CLAIM
Washington State has no specific legislation that addresses the rights of
intersex infants, but the State does have a constitutional provision analogous
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution reads, “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law[,]“ which is fundamentally similar to the Federal Constitution’s
mandate that the states not deprive their citizens of due process rights.132
State common law has recognized the relative and potential congruence of
the federal and state constitutional protections, and resolves them
sequentially where they are both at issue, beginning with the state
constitutional issue.133 The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged
that there are circumstances in which the state constitution might create
individual rights that extend beyond the scope of the Federal Constitution;
presumably, this creates an opportunity for protection even in situations in
which the federal claim falls short.134 The state courts will consider claims
for protection in light of state constitutional history, preexisting state law,
structural differences between state and federal constitutions, and unique
interests the state might have in the subject matter.135
The Federal Fourteenth Amendment protections could conceivably fail to
cover intersex infants, but the state constitution is far more likely to include
protections for intersex infants. If we apply the principles of Windsor, in
which the Supreme Court struck down federal legal classifications that
deprived individuals of individual rights that the State was attempting to
protect, we are left with an odd legal paradox that seems to run up against
the Supremacy Clause.136
132
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Washington State courts have held that article I, section 3 of the state
constitution relies upon the same reasoning and interpretations as the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.137 Given that there are
no guiding state statutes or constitutional common law precedent that would
indicate a specific state interest in perpetuating surgical sex assignment for
intersex infants, the state constitution has been interpreted as providing at
least the same degree of protection as the Fourteenth Amendment.138
Washington State often considers the state constitution’s protections to be
more expansive than those covered by the Federal Constitution.139 The
Washington Supreme Court considers the following factors when deciding
whether the state constitution exceeds the Federal Constitution: “(1) the
textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4)
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular
state or local concern.”140
The textual and structural factors indicate parity between the federal and
state protections, as the text of the state constitution141 is nearly identical to
the text of the Federal Constitution.142 Although the differing grammatical
subjects of the sentences establishing due process rights in each constitution

Fourteenth Amendment excludes intersex persons categorically as an unqualified class
for protection, then the federal courts may be required to recognize the state protections.
Windsor differed from this hypothetical situation in that it contrasted federal and state
statutes. Presumably, however, the underlying principle that the federal government
cannot specifically deprive a group of rights that are derived from state protection can be
extrapolated to constitutional interpretation. This discussion is somewhat beyond the
scope of this analysis, but would be highly relevant in the situation where the court does
not agree with this paper’s prescription of including intersex persons within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection.
137
See King, 174 P.3d at 666–67 (holding that federal court analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment was suitable to discussing the same liberty interests protected by the state
constitution).
138
See id. at 666–67; Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811.
139
Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 814.
140
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could create legal distinction, Washington courts have interpreted a state
actor requirement into the meaning of section three’s text.143 Additionally,
no preexisting state law addresses intersex rights, nor are the problems of
intersex infants so localized as to be a matter for specific local concern.
Therefore, the Washington Constitution does not necessarily expand beyond
the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, but protects the same rights as
its federal counterpart.
If both the state and federal constitutions protect the liberty, privacy, and
bodily integrity of intersex persons then, even under a limited Windsor
interpretation, the state would be required to show an interest that rises
above bare rational basis.144 Given what is known about intersex persons,
the impact of the concealment method’s early infant surgical alteration, and
the importance of gender identity, the government would not be able to rely
on its interest in protecting the welfare of people born intersex.145 At first
glance, it would seem that the government could articulate a compelling
interest in preserving binary sex as a socially vital norm or value, but this
argument fails the targeted deprivation standard of the line of cases
extending from Romer v. Evans. These cases established that a government
policy is not constitutionally enforceable when its purpose is to reinforce
cultural narratives that deprive culture-transgressing individuals of their
fundamental rights.146 For these reasons, intersex persons like M.C. should
be able to rely on state and federal substantive due process protections
against sex assignment surgery. Unfortunately, recognition of this right does
not completely address the harms suffered by intersex persons.
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V. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ACTIONS: THE LIMITATIONS OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Informed Consent: Rights Held by Parents
A due process claim relies upon the existence of a state actor, both in the
federal and state instances.147 The circumstances of M.C.’s case present a
situation in which M.C. was unable to consent to a surgery that had a
drastic, harmful impact on him later in life.148 The state DSS officials
consented to the surgery on his behalf because of M.C.’s status as a ward of
the state.149 The substantive due process claim relies on the fact that the
actor who consented to M.C.’s surgery was a government actor. If M.C.’s
mother had given consent, prior to the termination of her parental rights,
then the claim of a substantive due process violation would likely not have
survived the motion for summary judgment.
The substantive due process rights of an infant are considered to be
protected when parents give consent on the infant's behalf.150 If M.C.’s
parents had been the ones to agree to the recommendation of the physicians,
then the Fourteenth Amendment would not have been available as a
remedy. Clearly, this is problematic for those seeking to use the Fourteenth
Amendment as a means of protecting intersex infants generally, as the vast
majority of parents would likely consent to surgeries recommended by
physicians. Even if misled by physicians or subjected to direct and willful
impositions of restrictive sex identity classifications, the Fourteenth
Amendment is powerless, as it “erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”151
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B. Merits of Substantive Due Process Claims in Light of the State Actor
Requirements
In addition to protecting infants who are wards of the state, the right to be
intersex could be used to prevent other forms of government encouragement
of or complicity in these surgeries; grants, public funding, and other
regulatory incentives could be attacked as supporting or providing for
private actions that infringe on intersex persons’ fundamental rights. Most
importantly, a judicial designation of a fundamental liberty interest in
protection from unnecessary surgery has a profound impact on the culture
and discussion of intersex persons’ rights. Many parents agree to
physicians’ recommendations of surgery in a relative vacuum, unaware of
the long-term implications or available alternatives.152 Legal recognition of
a right establishes a foothold for non-binary sex identity within the larger
cultural narrative.
If the narrative of gender and sex identity changes, or counter-narratives
of non-binary possibilities for sex identification begin to emerge, then there
is greater social impetus and possibility for collateral protections for
intersex infants. These protections could take the form of altered medical
practices, legislative protections, or alterations to the cultural systems that
perpetuate the harms to intersex persons.

VI. AUXILIARY SOLUTIONS AND REMEDIES
A. Medical Reform and Medical Torts: Standard of Care Endorsement of
Surgery Moratoriums
Some advocates have emphasized the importance of an alteration in the
medical practices and standards of physicians, focusing on the practices that
harm intersex persons rather than on legal solutions.153 This approach has
distinctive advantages over a solution rooted in legal constitutional
152
153
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protections. Medical standards of care and internal medical policies,
ultimately, are the targets of legal action. Additionally, a self-enforced
moratorium on infant sex assignment surgery undertaken by the medical
profession could bypass problems of disparities between private and public
actors.
This solution focused on medical practices has appeal for legal advocates
as well, as medical practices can be changed through consistently successful
litigation centered on medical tort claims.154 Until fairly recently, the
viability of tort claims was significantly diminished due to US
jurisprudence regarding medical torts that protected doctors from liability
where “the medical procedures are consistent with the custom of the
profession and where they have obtained the patient’s consent.”155
However, gradually changing understandings and standards have eroded the
justifiability of surgical sex assignment and concealment, creating the
opportunity to challenge infant sex assignment as outside of the custom of
medical practice.156
As a result of increased advocacy by activists and others, as well as new
revelations about the effects of infant sex assignment for intersex persons,
the medical profession is gradually backing away from the concealment
method as the protocol for dealing with intersex infants.157 There is
increased awareness and recognition that sex is created, rather than
discovered, in intersex infants.158 Legal advocates can build on this
momentum to bring medical tort claims against “hold outs” who continue to
adhere to Dr. Money’s conception of sex and gender creation by physicians.
Medical tort claims are at issue in M.C. v. Aaronson’s claims under state
154
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law and it would behoove advocates to monitor discussion of the “custom
of the profession” in surgically assigning sex to intersex infants.159
B. Statutory Remedies
The other promising avenue by which intersex persons can be protected
from unnecessary surgeries is through statutory protection. Although strong
arguments can be made to justify and advocate for legislative protections
for intersex infants, significant obstacles must be overcome. Federal statutes
could potentially conflict with constitutional limitations that also restrict
their application to state actors, as can be observed in the application of
Title VII protections. Additionally, legislative solutions and protections
create, by necessity, a class of persons to be protected. If individuals are
required to fit into a specific class for legislative protection, rather than
allowed to retain an individually vested right, then we run into the very
problem that intersex exclusion identifies: potential under inclusion due to
restrictive narratives.160
Additionally, legislative action that does target the private actions of
parents would likely encounter strong opposition. Parents would likely
object to regulation of their parental autonomy to determine the best
interests of their children.161 Strong cultural and legal customs permit as
much parental autonomy as possible in the raising of children, including the
power to make medical decisions on children’s behalf.162 Legislative action,
though more flexible than the Fourteenth Amendment, could well be
inadequate for addressing the private behaviors of parents.
Cultural recognition and endorsement of intersex rights could be far more
effective remedies than stand-alone formalistic protections, although these
are less auxiliary solutions to substantive due process rights protection than
159
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they are necessary components of any significant social and legal change.
Intersex-specific legal protections benefit from collateral cultural awareness
in the same sense that gender and sexuality protections simultaneously
propel and are the product of cultural awareness and society-wide
understanding. The problems faced by intersex persons result from the
exclusion of intersex identity from traditional cultural narratives; the harms
they suffer are the result of third parties magnanimously or fearfully trying
to drag them into these ill-fitting narratives. The underlying goal of tort
litigation, legislative protections, or constitutional recognition should be to
address the harms of these narratives and the injustice created by legal
endorsement of their ubiquity.163

VII. CONCLUSION
“Anything that gives us new knowledge gives an opportunity to be
more rational” – Herbert Simon164
The law, perhaps more than any other component of our society, holds
itself out as an institution in which reason and intellect are harnessed to the
benefit of the misunderstood. Intersex persons, like many other groups who
are marginalized by cultural narratives, have suffered from others’ inability
to see anything but their transgression from a restrictive “reality.” Without
consideration, study, and reflection, the law runs the risk of continuing the
unfortunate traditions that have harmed intersex persons. Children like M.C.
should not be chained to bodies imposed on them by the lack of flexibility
or thoughtfulness of society. It is my hope that advocates and judges will
163
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exercise inclusiveness and thoughtful consideration of intersex realities. I
hope that with knowledge, and a genuine desire to do justice, advocates and
judges will recognize that human dignity and respect far outweigh our need
to preserve convenient illusions.s
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